Escalation Through Deterrence: Paradoxes in U.S. Policy Towards Iran
By: Hayes Chitty
Up to this point, United States military action in Iran has aimed at “deterrence”. The goal of deterrence, as understood in IR Theory, is to prevent conflicts between two states through large scale, seemingly insurmountable threats. The most glaring example of deterrence theory in practice was during the Cold War when the USSR and USA raced to build massive nuclear arsenals. In this, the threat of mutual destruction was so high between the two nations that the most rational option was to avoid conflict altogether. In the modern day, The United States (under the Trump administration) has attempted to employ deterrence theory in Iran by initiating large scale economic blockades, large-scale military operations, and threatening to decimate Iran as a whole. However, President Donald Trump’s deterrence policies have failed in a fundamental way, that is, they have escalated violence in the region rather than mitigating it. I argue that this failure results from the nature of Trump’s deterrence policies themselves. Furthermore, I argue that the theoretical backbone of these policies, rooted in IR’s Deterrence Theory, provides a justification for unnecessary violence that is paradoxical to its stated intent.
The Trump administration’s approach in Iran, which is alleged to be aimed at deterrence by the current administration, is characterized by intimidation. Their actions, whether they be large-scale bombings, rhetorical threats, or economic sanctions have the same end: make the prospect of conflict seem futile. At first glance, the logic behind these actions is sound. If a state thinks war would harm their nation’s livelihood more than it would help it, then perhaps it would be more profitable to avoid conflict altogether. In this respect, deterrence promotes peace through the promise (or threat) of greater violence.
Since the beginning of the conflict in Iran, this approach has had a paradoxical effect. Trump’s rhetorical threats, which he posted on social media in response to Iran’s refusal to reopen the strait of Hormuz, promised that “A whole civilization will die tonight” (CBS News New York 2026). While he was attempting to scare Iran into conformity, Trump’s actions had the opposite effect. After this threat, Iran did not reopen the strait and extensive military and diplomatic efforts were required in light of Trump’s unfulfilled promise.
Trump’s deterrence policy has also failed in regards to the military force that has actually been utilized in Iran by his administration. Far from reducing the unnecessary violence in the region, this military action has resulted in the deaths of at least 3,264 Iranians, 1701 of whom were civilians, along with 13 U.S. military personnel (Reuters 2026). The outcome of these ineffective policies have repeatedly suggested that, contrary to its stated intent, deterrence policies amplify unnecessary conflict and violence rather than mitigate it.
This violence is paradoxically fortified by IR’s deterrence theory. Deterrence Theory, as previously mentioned, attempts to mitigate overall conflict by utilizing (or, threatening to utilize) insurmountable military force. History contains several instances in which Deterrence Theory has been successfully employed in order to avoid large-scale conflict. However, in the current case of the Trump administration, action taken against Iran, while upheld by Deterrence Theory, has perpetuated violence in contradiction to these historical examples.
The most notable success in the history of Deterrence Theory comes from the Cold War. In this, the world was under bipolar control with the USSR and USA representing two (relatively) equal powers. The nuclear arms race, which today stands as the most prominent manifestation of deterrence theory, assured that neither of these powers could decimate the other without holistic retribution. As such, both countries were able to mitigate violence through the threat of total annihilation. This mutual assurance is the primary reason that Deterrence Theory was successful in mitigating conflict during this period. This relationship between the prospect of violence and deterrence from conflict, while seemingly paradoxical itself, formed the framework through which conflict has been handled since this time.
The historical success of Deterrence Theory raises the question of why it has failed under the current administration. The answer to this question does not only come from the specific techniques used by the current administration, but rather stems from a theoretical limitation of Deterrence Theory itself. Namely, the fact that Deterrence Theory, when utilized in conflicts between unequal powers, transforms from a utilitarian framework for reaching peace into a theoretical justification for hegemonic domination and unnecessary violence. In other words, because Iran cannot conceivably rival the military capabilities of the United States, Deterrence Theory simply becomes a framework through which the United States enforces their specific will. Far from being a process that mitigates total violence, Deterrence Theory, in this sense, justifies unnecessary violence simply because the stronger military wants a specific outcome.
The failure of Deterrence Theory in Iran reveals the limitations of its applicability to non-equal powers. When the disparity of power between two nations is stark, Deterrence Theory operates as a method of domination rather than a limitation to conflict. What remains is a theory of coercion that increases unnecessary violence in a region in contradiction to its original purpose.
References:
CBS News New York. 2026. "President Trump Threatens Iran to Open Strait of Hormuz." CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/video/president-trump-threatens-iran-to-open-strait-o f-hormuz/
Reuters. 2026. "How Many People Have Been Killed in the US-Israel War on Iran?" April 7. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-people-have-been-killed-us-israel-war-iran-2026-04-07/.
