Russian, Iran, and the Renewed Pivot to Asia

By: Sam Farnsworth

Is there a pattern to global war? What tends to happen when the current hegemonic empire is challenged by an emerging rival? The second Trump administration has given an old initiative a second life: the so-called Pivot to Asia has been renewed in response to the recent rise of China. This refocus on China will have major impacts on the balance of geopolitics, especially in regards to what role the ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East will play in light of this shift.  

Originating in 2011 during the Obama administration, American foreign policy pushed this core message: “America is going to play a leadership role in Asia for decades to come” (1). Obama even described himself as the first “Pacific President”, seeking to bolster trade in the region and compete with Chinese influences. This initial Pivot to Asia, however, stalled as the US became further entrenched in the Middle East and in Europe. The lengthy withdrawal from Afghanistan, the rise of insurgent groups in Iraq and Syria, and the unforeseen war in Ukraine proved to be more pressing for US foreign policy than the more slow and gradual maneuvering of China. This “Lost Decade” (2011-2021), is perfectly exemplified with the 2017 withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific partnership trade deal (an agreement to reduce tariffs and boost trade), signaling a resignation from the commitments outlined by Obama six years previously (4). In fact, the only tangible effect of this initiative seemed only to increase tension with China, as the rhetoric of a perceived American threat allowed China to justify its own domestic aims, most notably the militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, expanding their military presence and increasing tension with their neighbors (2). Despite these failures, this idea of containing China is regaining popularity in 2025, with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth citing China as a “peer competitor” with the “capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific,” interests mainly being a monopolization on commerce and security (3). 

A new emphasis on China implies the US will need to disentangle itself militarily from Europe and the Middle East. This can only be achieved if NATO and Middle Eastern allies ramp up their own domestic military expenditure and contribute more to the overall alliance structure. Take Europe for example: EU countries are far from China and the Pacific, and benefit greatly from bilateral trade. Europe, however, is terrified of Russia, something which can be used to American advantage. For a renewed pivot to China, the US is incentivized to amplify the threat of Russia, and to use the fear of American abandonment of Europe to scare NATO allies into greater defense spending. In fact, this seems to be happening. NATO countries saw record defense spending in 2024, largely driven “by the ongoing Russian threat and concerns about possible US disengagement within the alliance” according to political scientist Jade Ricard (5). Pete Hegseth reiterated this statement when he was in Europe this past February, claiming “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe” (3). In parallel, the US can use this exact same strategy in the Middle East, this time swapping Russia with Iran. Arab nations are terrified of Iran and its potential nuclear capabilities, and this fear is what has led to new defense agreements of “major non-NATO allies”, such as Qatar in 2022 and Saudi Arabia just recently in November 2025 (6). In fact, Saudi Arabia is still the single largest recipient of US military exports, with Qatar, Kuwait, and Egypt all within the top 10, despite the increase of arms exports to Europe (7). 

A pivot to China further implies that the US has less of an interest to end these conflicts with Russia or Iran. If either of these countries are exposed to be weaker than they really are, or if fighting dies down, US allies' defense spending may diminish enough to not meet the requisite level needed to focus on China. On the other hand, if fighting becomes too intense, there is greater potential to disrupt global trade or spiral into something unmanageable. Thus, the US can benefit by keeping these wars with Russia and Iran at a steady, manageable state for as long as possible. This means amplifying the threat during times of greater calm, or deterring its allies during times of escalation. This seems to be roughly what we have seen over the past three years. Take, for example, the current threat of supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine during the drafting of a potential peace plan, or the demanding of an Israeli ceasefire with Iran just as the Iranian government threatened closure of the strait of Hormuz (10, 9). Furthermore, these risky maneuvers on the part of the US seems to indicate advanced knowledge of the inner workings of Russian and Iranian decision making, most likely made possible through the US outsized jurisdiction over global internet traffic, pushing American espionage capabilities to never before seen heights (see NSA’s PRISM program). 

Additionally, a switch to China incentivizes the US to amplify the BRICS narrative. BRICS is the organization of many major non-Western nations seeking to strengthen economic ties and move away from the US dollar, with notable members including Russia, India, China, and Iran. If America can frame Russia and Iran as proxies of China, then China is viewed as a more proximate threat to Europe and the Middle East than it otherwise would have been. This has only been bolstered by Chinese economic support of Russia since the invasion began. Some political theorists, such as John Mearshiemer, view pushing Russia and Iran into Chinese arms as a mistake, but when seen in light of this larger refocus, appears as a logical next step in this American grand strategy (8). 

All of these various foreign policy decisions have also been working in tandem with elevated military expenditure in the Pacific, with a jump in spending by major US allies such as Japan, Taiwan, and Australia in 2024 and new defense treaties such as AUKUS (defense agreement between Australia, US, and UK) in 2021. China itself has grown its own military spending by a whopping 7% in 2024 as well (5). Thus, militarization is erupting all over the world and is increasingly being connected in new and terrifying ways. 

To recap, a second policy of pivoting to Asia indicates a prolonging of proxy wars with Russia and Iran, a further entrenching of geopolitical divides and defense agreements, and a continuation of a global increase in defense expenditure. As these trends continue and tensions rise, the chance of a 21st century global war appears more and more likely. It is the next iteration in the eternal pattern of an empire's rise and fall. What kind of war this will be, only time will tell. But what is certain is that this new Pivot to Asia will have lasting impacts on the state of geopolitics and the balance of global power for years to come.

Works Cited

1.https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/ 

2.https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/book-review-lost-decade-the u-s-pivot-to-asia-and-the-rise-of-chinese-power/ 

3. https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/global-markets-breakingviews-2025-02-21/

4.https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-autumn-2024--issue-no-28/the-us-pivot-to asia-and-american-grand-strategy 

5.https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-exp enditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges 

6.https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/new-us-saudi-security-deal-raises-questions/story?id= 127753446 

7.https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/ukraine-worlds-biggest-arms-importer united-states-dominance-global-arms-exports-grows-russian 

8.https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Why-the-Ukraine-Crisis-Is .pdf 

9.https://www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/iran-threatens-to-close-strait-of-hormuz-as-s hipping-risks-being-sucked-into-regional-war/2-1-1833044 

10. https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/31/politics/pentagon-tomahawks-trump-ukraine