Nuclear Negotiation: The Bargaining Power of Contemporary Politics
By: Hayes Chitty
On June 22nd, 2025, the United States military launched a three pronged attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in an operation that took on the alias of “Operation Midnight Hammer” (Al Jazeera, 2025). Armed with 30,000 pound “bunker buster” bombs, United States aircraft effectively destroyed (or caused major damage to) The Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (Washington Post, 2025). Since the day of this attack, questions have arisen about US intervention along these lines, with dialogue concerning everything from broader ethical concerns to legitimate inquiries regarding the constitutionality of the attacks. This article aims to review the recent policy discourse regarding Iranian nuclear capacities. Additionally, through a review of these policies, I aim to gauge the merits of the ethical arguments both for and against US intervention in this capacity.
The history of nuclear relations between Iran and the US reveal that Operation Midnight Hammer was not an attack that occurred out of nowhere. In fact, the antagonistic relationship that has fueled this nuclear debate finds its roots in the early 2000s. During this point of history, and in the years that followed, the United States took several measures to assure that Iran could not complete a nuclear weapon, fearing that if Iran were to develop such a weapon, a regional arms race may begin. In the eyes of the US government, this would prove to be a liability to global security, and ultimately shift the power dynamics in an unfavorable fashion for the US. The most notable of the measures taken to assure Iran could not build a nuclear weapon manifested itself in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement between Iran and the major world powers that allowed for surveillance (primarily conducted by the United States) in order to assure that Iran’s nuclear projects remained peacefully oriented (The Guardian, 2025). However, in 2018, during Donald Trump’s first term, the United States exited this agreement. The departure of the US from the JCPOA was met with dissent from both the remainder of the United Nations Security Council, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, both of whom denied the Trump administration’s claims that Iran had broken the agreement in any capacity, and continuously reassured the US that Iran had remained faithful to the agreements outlined in the JCPOA (Reuters, 2025). Since this development, nuclear relations between Iran and the US have regressed back to a mode of hostility, a mode which culminated in the aforementioned bombing of 3 Iranian nuclear sites.
While Operation Midnight Hammer may have set back the potential for a nuclear equipped Iranian state, it certainly didn’t eliminate the “threat” forever, and diplomatic negotiations between the two nations have recently picked back up (PBS News, 2025). The conversations surrounding this subject today are ambivalent at best. However, as the current Trump administration has toed the line between continuing to publicly speak against the formation of an Iranian nuclear state, and using third party intermediates, such as Israel, to gauge the situation as to avoid becoming intertwined with unrelated domestic conflicts. Iranian official Saeed Khatibzadeh, along with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have maintained that Iran’s nuclear projects are oriented towards civilian use, and have continued to posit the notion that nuclear bombs are not, and have at no point been on the agenda for Iran (Reuters, 2025). Most recently, it has been reported that Iran is leveraging their relationship with Saudi Arabia in an attempt to persuade the United States to resume negotiations regarding nuclear facilities. President Trump commented on the issue, stating that “I am totally open to it [resuming negotiations]” (Daftari, 2025). The situation remains in flux today.
Despite the contradictory messages sent by both parties in regards to this issue, there remains a broader ethical question that I aim to uncover. This question can be posed in numerous ways, but the specific articulation I wish to discuss is such: is it permissible for the United States to intervene in Iranian nuclear bomb production? Domestically, opinions throughout the US have divided into 2 camps, pro-intervention, and anti-intervention on the basis of international sovereignty and ethical concerns.
Before surveying these positions, it is of importance to reiterate that it remains unclear as to whether or not Iran wants to build nuclear weapons in the first place, as both officials within Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency have maintained that Iran has not taken any steps toward developing a nuclear arsenal (Washington Post, 2025). Despite this, it has remained the US position that measures must be taken to prevent Iran from attempting to build these weapons.
Returning to the discussion at hand, there are a large number of congressional Republicans that agree with US intervention in Iranian nuclear production, and further support the actions of the Trump administration in ordering Operation Midnight Hammer. Such arguments usually are made manifest through appeals to potential anxieties if Iran were to get their hands on a nuclear bomb, as many argue that the Ayatollah, who has final say in all state decisions, cannot be trusted with such power, and could even be a threat to United States security.
Alternatively, those who argue against US intervention in this regard often appeal to national sovereignty, and posit that coercive policies which force Iran’s hand result in increased tension in the surrounding region, and ultimately set the precedent that self-determination on the state level ends where the United States’ interests begin. Such claims are illuminated by the fact that these interventions are being taken against a nation that remains (at least, formally) within the bounds of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Considering the inconclusive evidence surrounding the steps Iran has taken to build nuclear, coupled with the arguments of those against US intervention, it is fitting to address what I view to be the underlying motivations in the American measures taken thus far. My argument can be summarized as such: US intervention in nuclear bomb production has little to do with national security, and alternatively, has everything to do with preventing Iran from getting a seat at the international bargaining table. Given the fact that there is little evidence pointing towards Iran trying to build nuclear weaponry, along with the fact that if Iran were to ever use nuclear weaponry in an offensive capacity against the US, the destruction of their state would be all but assured, it seems foolish to believe that anyone in Washington actually fears a nuclear conflict with Iran. It also seems equally foolish to suspect that anyone in Iran wants a nuclear conflict with the United States, as the destruction of the Iranian state would be all but guaranteed. Instead, it seems far more likely that officials in Washington fear the power Iran would command if they were to obtain nuclear capabilities. This “power” I refer to is simply a legitimate seat at the table, or, the access to negotiate with other world powers without working around the threat of nuclear destruction. This bargaining power is one which the United States has long held (whether purposely or simply by virtue of having nuclear capabilities) over Iran, and the preventative measures the US has taken thus far seem to me to be made out of fear of a potentially level playing field. Thus, the ethical question shifts from one of preventing a potential security threat, to preventing Iran’s diplomatic equality, highlighting the hypocrisy that underlies the interventionist actions of the US thus far.
Works Cited
Al Jazeera. “Iran Says Moment for ‘Effective’ Nuclear Talks with US Not Yet Reached.” Al Jazeera, 20 Aug. 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/20/iran-says-moment-for-effective-nuclear-talks with-us-not-yet-reached.
Daftari, Amir. “Trump Says Iran Wants Nuclear Deal ‘Badly.’” Newsweek, Newsweek, 19, Nov. 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-saudi-arabia-mbs-11071293
PBS News. “Iran and U.S. Resume Nuclear Talks in Oman.” PBS NewsHour, 2025, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-u-s-nuclear-negotiations-return-to-oman.
Reuters. “Iran Seeks ‘Peaceful’ Nuclear Deal with US, Official Says.” Reuters, 11 Nov. 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-us-sending-contradictory-messages -nuclear-talks-2025-11-11/.
The Guardian. “Iran Announces Official End to 10-Year-Old Nuclear Agreement.” The Guardian, 18 Oct. 2025,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/18/iran-announces-official-end-to-10-year old-nuclear-agreement.
Washington Post. “IAEA: Iran Not Complying with Nuclear Obligations.” Washington Post, 12 June 2025,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/12/iran-nuclear-breach-iaea-un-watchdog/.
